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1. Introduction
Educational policy in the UK has taken an interesting turn.  The preoccupation with 
standards in schools which has been with us for many years has given rise to a set of aims 
which policy-makers would hardly have recognised two decades ago.  Not only should 
educators pursue the traditional aims of imparting knowledge, understanding and skills to 
children.  They should set the scene for such aims by getting children into an ‘appropriate 
condition’ from which to learn.  This can mean anything from eating a good breakfast to 
playing outdoors or developing good ‘social and emotional skills’.  Schools should 
promote these ‘conditions for learning’ as seriously as they have always promoted 
learning itself.  This idea has spawned an abundance of social research, policy initiatives, 
business ventures and public debate.  But does it make sense?  
The idea emerged in the highly politicised educational climate of the 1990s, in 
which the alleged failures of mass education were giving rise to an obsession with 
standards in schools. The ills of under-achievement, disaffection and violence would 
dissipate, it was thought, if only standards could be raised.  But a difficulty emerged.  A 
standards agenda involves identifying and possibly shaming children and schools that 
fail.  The social consequences of educational failure include disaffection, delinquency, 
violence and so on: the very problems that the standards agenda set out to address.  Such 
an agenda may help some children, but for others, arguably, it makes matters worse by 
drawing attention to their failures and making them feel unworthy and excluded.  
It was this concern that led to a supplementary agenda focusing on so-called non-
cognitive traits like confidence, motivation, resilience, well-being and self-esteem.  Such 
traits are thought to be possessed by individuals to a greater or lesser degree, and to play 
a crucial part in learning.  Children with low confidence levels or poor self-esteem, for 
example, are seen as more easily frustrated and defeated by challenges than children who 
have high levels of these.  The idea emerged that there are necessary affective conditions 
for successful learning, and that these can be usefully boosted, heightened or enhanced.   
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I shall call this the enhancement agenda in education.  It may be pointed out, 
rightly, that educationalists sometimes talk about enhancing attainment or achievement, 
as though the enhancement agenda is not distinct from the standards agenda after all.  But 
the typical use of the term ‘enhancement’ is not this.  More frequently, its object is some 
sort of affective disposition, or a condition like ‘well-being’ that presupposes certain 
affective dispositions.  The enhancement agenda is not simply about getting children to 
perform better.  It is about getting them to feel better—more motivated, more confident, 
happier—and about the idea that feeling good in these ways leads to success at school 
and in life generally.  
The upshot of these ideas is that schools have a duty to enhance certain feelings, 
and recent policy documents like the Children’s Plan (2007) and the Social and 
Emotional Aspects of Learning (SEAL) (2005) programme are full of exhortations to 
schools to fulfil this duty, and guidance about how to go about it.  The former identifies 
as one of its ‘goals for 2020’: ‘to enhance children and young people’s well-being, 
particularly at transition points in their lives’ (Children’s Plan Executive Summary, p.19). 
It goes on to describe the ‘positive activities’ that ‘develop social and personal skills’ and 
‘promote well-being’ (ibid, p. 20).  The SEAL Guidance goes into greater detail, and 
includes a section called ‘Managing Feelings’, in which children are taught to say things 
like: ‘I know what makes me feel good and know how to enhance these comfortable 
feelings.’  Another section from the SEAL Guidance called ‘Going for Goals!’ talks 
about an inspection framework that will assess outcomes like ‘enjoyment’, rather than 
focusing simply on attainment. 
As with many policy ideas, much of this is laudable.  The Children’s Plan in 
particular takes a practical approach to well-being, accepting the responsibility of the 
government to put real money into the support of families, the provision of safe play 
areas, health promotion, housing etc.  (It remains to be seen whether these worthy 
intentions will be realised.)  More problematic is the idea that schools should undertake 
to enhance children’s feelings directly, through a variety of expertly devised strategies.  It 
is not obvious, in the first place, that one can identify particular feelings as 
unconditionally good, so that more is necessarily better.  In general, confidence is a 
beneficial feeling to have, but it can be excessive and associated with risky behaviour. 
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Some important empirical research (Emler, 2001) has prompted questions about the 
benefits of feelings (and attitudes) that are assumed to be positively linked to effective 
learning. 
There are also ethical and conceptual questions about the project of enhancing 
feelings.   Philosopher Richard Smith (2002) has expressed concerns about the ‘inward 
turn’ in education, and Ecclestone talks about the recent ‘therapeutic ethos’ as 
emphasising ‘fragile identities’, turning children into victims.  More fundamentally, one 
needs to raise the conceptual question: what exactly is it that educators and policy-makers 
are seeking to enhance?  The Centre for the Wider Benefits of Learning at the Institute of 
Education in London (2008) has usefully documented the bewildering variety of terms 
associated with the concept of enhancement in current educational policy.  Many of these 
employ the term ‘self’: for example, self-esteem, self-discipline, self-awareness, self-
concept, self-efficacy and self-regulation.  There are several ‘umbrella’ terms which are 
thought to embrace a variety of ‘skills’ or ‘qualities’: non-cognitive skills, socio-
emotional abilities, well-being, emotional intelligence etc.  And there are some familiar 
terms which already have a secure place in the home and classroom, like perseverance, 
resilience and motivation.  An enhancement agenda that is worth its salt needs to 
rationalise this assortment of terms and clarify its basic aims.   
In Section 2, I explore what I call an ordinary concept of enhancement as a 
component of moral education.  I suggest that the primary object of enhancement in this 
context is feeling, emotion or passion. We try, for example, to enhance children’s 
confidence and hope, and conversely to inhibit feelings like fear, shame and despair.  We 
try to do this appropriately rather than indiscriminately, for the context is all-important. 
There are times, we feel, when children should be encouraged to experience more rather 
than less shame or fear.  However, there are loose connections between emotion and 
learning which educators need to be aware of.  In general, children do not learn well 
when they experience high levels of shame or fear.
This brief introduction to the concept of enhancement is based on the philosophy 
of Aristotle, and it leads to a discussion in section 3 of the enhancement agenda in current 
educational policy.  This involves measuring and then enhancing ‘something’ that is 
believed to cause children to learn.  The indeterminacy of this ‘something’, the concept of 
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measurement and some empirical disagreements about causality will occupy us here.  I 
shall question the shift from an informal enhancement agenda (in the classroom and the 
home) to a more formal version of this in the domain of public policy.
Finally, I explore the concept of self-esteem, and present an account of this 
concept that in my view deserves a place in education.  Concepts go in and out of 
fashion, and this one has passed its peak.  This is partly because outrageous claims have 
been made on its behalf, and partly because of an empirical study that claimed to overturn 
our cherished assumptions about self-esteem.  When Polly Toynbee (2001) hailed this 
study in an article headed “At last we can abandon that tosh about low self-esteem”, some 
of us knew that the matter deserved a closer look.  
2.  Enhancement and its objects
What does ‘enhancement’ mean?  Dictionaries are not always useful philosophically, but 
in this case the Shorter Oxford Dictionary gets us off to a good start.  ‘Enhancement’ (the 
dictionary tells us) comes from the Latin root ‘altus’, meaning ‘high’.  To enhance is to 
‘lift, raise or set up’.  It generally means raising or increasing ‘the price, value, 
importance or attractiveness’ of something.
The concept of enhancement thus has a spatial aspect and a normative dimension. 
It is not used literally in a spatial sense (we do not ‘enhance’ the pictures on our walls 
when we raise them), but there is an analogue to the spatial aspect which the dictionary 
fails to mention. This is the notion of ‘heightening’ (or intensifying) a property, quality or 
sensation. Your graphics software allows you to enhance the colours on your screen; in a 
similar sense, a beauty therapist may enhance your tan. An audio technician may enhance 
the sound on your hi-fi, and a meal or sexual experience or afternoon in the sun may 
enhance your sensations of pleasure. I shall call this the intensity dimension.  
Both the intensity and normative dimensions are relevant to the enhancement 
agenda in education. This agenda is based on the idea that successful learning 
presupposes certain ways of feeling.  This suggests at least two things: 1) that there is 
greater value in some feelings than in others (the normative dimension); and 2) that it is 
possible for educators to ‘heighten’ the feelings that are valuable, and inhibit feelings that 
are less so (the intensity dimension). There is generally greater value, for example, in 
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remaining calm before difficult learning challenges than in getting agitated and frustrated 
by them.  ‘Calming children down’, i.e. enhancing pleasant, hopeful feelings at the 
expense of painful, hopeless ones, is therefore the business of educators.
However this suggestion may worry us in various ways. 
1. Although we can imagine contexts in which ‘calming a child down’ seems 
like the right thing to do, we can also imagine contexts in which this would be 
wrong.  Particular children may be better off agitated; it may be their way of 
getting down to some serious, creative work, or thinking through a problem. 
In this case the ambition to calm them down may seem patronising and 
misconceived.
2. There is arguably a sinister aspect to the notion of enhancement, associated 
with notions like manipulation and control.  If enhancing a child’s confidence 
is like intensifying the colour saturation on a computer, this sounds intrusive 
and even tyrannical.  The opposite idea of ‘inhibiting’ children’s feelings may 
also sound warning bells.  There is a fine line between inhibition and 
repression, and most of us would worry about educators who seek to do the 
latter.
Such concerns may be alleviated by a brief look at Aristotle’s theory of moral education, 
which is the background for this discussion.  Though not universally accepted in every 
detail, Aristotle’s theory of moral education as the cultivation of ‘sentimental 
dispositions’ is, many feel, a fundamentally correct account.  It captures the basic 
principles of thought and practice in this area, and provides strong answers to the 
concerns set out above.  Aristotle did not use a term corresponding exactly to the English 
term ‘enhance’, but he was concerned, as we are, with ways in which (as I should like to 
put it) adults ‘prevail upon’ children morally.  In particular, he was concerned about the 
responsibility to regulate, cultivate or moderate children’s feelings.  All these concepts 
have a causal implication, which we will examine more closely when we look at the 
enhancement agenda in a policy context.  
Whatever word we use, the basic idea is that adults should try to ‘cause’ children 
to have some feelings rather than others.  The first concern above was that what is right in 
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one context might be wrong in another; and this no-one need deny.  The Aristotelian 
position is expressed in this well-known passage:
…fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and 
pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to 
feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is intermediate and 
best, and this is characteristic of virtue. (NE: 1106b19)
This passage employs the distinctive Aristotelian concept of rightness.  Aristotle does not 
say, as some do: it is never right for children to experience anger or agitation.  He says 
that that there is a right time and a wrong time for these emotions, depending on the 
context.  In this regard, he was opposed to philosophers like Seneca the Stoic, who 
thought that anger and agitation are always indicators of moral weakness.  
However, Aristotle was conspicuously silent on the general question of which 
emotions should be experienced when.  He believed that adults should regulate the 
feelings of children ‘appropriately’, rather than according to a rule book.  This raises the 
question of how we know which feelings are appropriate and inappropriate, and 
Aristotle’s answer is considered by many unsatisfactory.  We should aim, he said, for the 
mean, that is, for what is “intermediate and best”.  We know what this is by exercising 
good judgement about the basic needs and interests—the ‘flourishing’—of the child. 
Whether Sally feels too fearful or too confident as she approaches her maths GCSE exam 
depends on what is best for Sally as an individual.  If she is a timid child, a confidence-
boost may do her good.  If she is arrogant and conceited, it may be appropriate to instil a 
little fear.   
For Aristotle there are objectively right and wrong ways to feel in particular 
circumstances, but no general account (nor is a general account possible in principle) of 
what these are.  On the one hand this is unsatisfactory; on the other, one may argue, it 
reflects the true relationship between language, value and reality.  That there are real  
values—i.e. objectively better and worse ways to feel in particular circumstances—is 
compatible with the impossibility of specifying in a general way what these are.  
If this is correct, an enhancement agenda had better face up to the fact.  It implies 
that the regulation of emotions belongs first and foremost in intimate contexts, like the 
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classroom and home, in which adults know and care about children and try to make 
sound judgements about their interests.  This perspective on the matter addresses the 
second concern above: that enhancement means manipulation and intrusion.  The 
difference between enhancing a child’s feelings of hope or confidence and enhancing the 
colour saturation on a screen is that the first has a crucial moral reference whereas latter 
has none.  There is and must be a normative dimension to enhancement: otherwise we are 
right to have serious concerns.  What this means in practice is that we hope that teachers 
and parents will ‘prevail upon’ children in ways that are, if not wise, at least benign.  We 
hope that they have children’s interests at heart, and make sound judgements about what 
these are.  This has implications for teacher selection and training, but it marks 
(regrettably, in some ways) the end of the road for philosophy.  Aristotle’s insight was 
that philosophy, or indeed any general discourse, takes us only a certain way towards the 
situations and happenings of everyday life.  This sounds a cautionary note not only for 
philosophers, but also for policy-makers.  
In the next section, I shall examine the policy perspective on enhancement, but 
first I want to bring out a dimension of emotion-regulation that can easily go missing. 
This is the cognitive dimension.  We have seen that emotions have varying levels of 
intensity, and this is why we can talk about enhancing them rather as we talk about 
enhancing colour.  It seems a small step from here to the thought that emotions are non-
cognitive states, and indeed the term ‘non-cognitive’ is peppered confusingly throughout 
many policy documents in relation to the concept of enhancement.  However emotions 
are both non-cognitive and cognitive, for they crucially involve thoughts, beliefs and 
judgements in addition to levels of intensity.  The emotion of anger, for example, in 
addition to a feeling of pain, involves a belief about having been slighted or wronged. 
The regulation of anger, in this respect, is not at all like the regulation of colour 
saturation, for in some circumstances it can be tempered or eliminated simply by showing 
a person that she made a mistake.  What she thought was a slight was no such thing.  In 
short, she misunderstood the situation, and when she understands it properly her anger 
should fade.  Her new understanding and the ebbing pain should (if she is rational) be 
one.  Certain beliefs or judgements simply are pleasurable or painful, and this is what it 
means to have an emotional life.  
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This point has important implications for an enhancement agenda.  I said that 
there is and must be a normative dimension to enhancement if we are to allay concerns 
about manipulation.  The cognitive dimension of emotion means that, in our regulation of 
other people’s emotions, we are or should be concerned about their interest in 
understanding themselves and the situations they are in.  If we simply wanted to ‘tone 
down’ an angry person’s pain, we might tell a lie, assuming the person has been 
grievously wronged.  However we cannot, and normally do not, systematically ignore 
considerations of understanding and truth when we seek to enhance or inhibit people’s 
feelings.  We believe that people have an interest in understanding the situations they are 
in, even though this can sometimes conflict with their interest in not experiencing too 
much pain.  It would be an unprincipled adult who tried indiscriminately to enhance 
children’s pleasure, irrespective of the extent to which they understood themselves or the 
situations they were in.    
This brings me to the policy agenda.  The project of enhancing children’s self-
esteem often sounds like a project that has drawn a firm line between cognitive and so-
called non-cognitive skills.  It suggests that the tendency to feel good about oneself 
should be promoted independently of the truth about one’s virtues, efforts or 
achievements.  It siphons off understanding and insight—the cognitive aspects of 
emotion—in favour of heightened positive feelings.  In some respects, this is not 
unreasonable.  I have argued that childhood is a time during which feelings about one’s 
worth develop through attachments to adults, and these can have lifelong importance 
(Cigman 2004).  There is nothing original about this idea, which I called ‘basic self-
esteem’, and which is derived from Freud’s theory of narcissism.  However, reality needs 
to set in, and children need to develop an ability to discriminate between true and false 
claims about themselves, and to experience, without being crushed by, pain.  
The policy agenda plucks the idea of regulating children’s feelings from the realm 
of individual encounters, and sets it down—apparently unaltered—in the realm of public 
policy.  It is not unaltered, however, for the concerns are different and the pressure on 
key concepts has changed.  The policy concerns include ‘system reform’ and lists of 
goals on the strength of which political careers will stand or fall. There are ‘high 
ambitions for children’s trusts to deliver measurable improvements for all children and 
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young people’, and there is guidance for schools on their ‘duty to promote well-being’. 
There are ‘promises’ to schools that they will be assessed on the fulfillment or non-
fulfillment of this duty, rather than simply on the basis of attainment. The focus is 
strongly on ‘measurable outcomes’, for there is no point (it would seem) in trying to 
enhance social and emotional skills nationally if one cannot determine objectively 
whether, and to what extent, one has succeeded.  
All this takes us a million miles from the home or classroom.  On an Aristotelian 
view, what need to be regulated are our familiar friends, the emotions. On the policy 
view, what need to be enhanced are things that we find much harder to grasp, like well-
being and social and emotional skills.  The need to measure these amounts to an 
inducement to exaggerate the non-cognitive dimensions of enhancement at the expense of 
the cognitive dimensions, with a serious cost to the integrity of the agenda.  We now need 
to look into this further.
  
3. The enhancement agenda in educational policy
The enhancement agenda has several requirements.  It needs to identify ‘something’ that 
is believed to support and improve learning.  It needs to show that this ‘something’ does 
in fact support and improve learning.  It needs to measure this ‘something’, and then 
enhance it.  Finally, it needs to prove that this ‘something’ has in fact been enhanced, 
through further measuring.
An initial difficulty is that the commitment to measurable outcomes means that 
the nature of what is being enhanced is not the first priority.  The first priority is to 
measure something which can be correlated with behavioural and other variables. 
Although Emler says that test scores should ‘behave in a manner that is consistent with 
what is known or believed to be the nature of the phenomenon’ (2001, p. 9), he does not 
treat this as a crucial aspect of the investigation.  His relative indifference to the ‘nature 
of the phenomenon’ is echoed in the social science literature, and I shall express this by 
saying that the enhancement agenda is committed to measuring quality Q, without 
necessarily knowing what Q is.
Ignorance about the nature of Q is evident is many ways.  Emler admits:
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Knowing that one has measured something with a reasonable degree of accuracy 
is not the same as knowing what one has measured or whether it is what one 
intended to measure… Despite imperfect agreement about its nature, levels of 
self-esteem can be reliably and easily measured.
So on the one hand, test scores should be ‘consistent with what is known or believed to 
be the nature of the phenomenon’, and on the other, we have ‘imperfect agreement about 
[self-esteem’s] nature.’ This is deeply puzzling.  Imagine someone saying: I have 
measured something, but I’m not sure whether it is heat, weight, height or light.  To 
measure something is to claim to know something rather precise about that thing, and it is 
hard to see how one can do this without knowing what ‘it’ is.  One may not understand 
the physical properties of heat, but measuring the temperature of something means at 
least knowing that one is measuring heat rather than weight.  We can imagine a child who 
gets this wrong.  She has learned to use a thermometer in the sense that she can get a 
correct reading, without understanding that the highest reading has something to do with 
the painful sensation of being burnt.  She needs to know this.  For a measurement to be 
meaningful, it must yield precise knowledge, not only of a numerical value but of the 
‘nature of the thing’ that is measured.  
Not only is the nature of Q (or, for Emler, self-esteem) problematic.  The nature 
of measurement is equally so.  Emler (2001) writes:
It is good practice in psychological measurement to demonstrate that one can 
obtain similar results using different methods of measurement. With respect to 
self-esteem, this has yet to be demonstrated.  But this should not discourage us 
from looking for patterns of evidence within the methods of measurement that are 
available. (p. 12)
This sounds to me like an admission that self-esteem measurement is not ‘good practice’, 
but my more fundamental concern is that it is not even measurement.  Wittgenstein 
(1953) has a telling comment about what it means to measure something:
Imagine someone saying: “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his hand on top 
of his head to prove it. (para. 279)
This remark is funny (philosophical humour was a serious business for Wittgenstein) 
precisely because a knowledge claim is being made that cannot be tested in any shape or 
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form.  I do not ‘know’ how tall I am when I place my hand on top of my head, because I 
have done nothing to suggest that I have measured the spatial dimension that we call 
‘height’.  I am (perhaps) going through some of the routine of measuring height, but I am 
crucially missing out the rest.  What I am missing is the possibility of alternative 
yardsticks (I am not only taller as measured by a slide-rule, but my clothes are too small, 
my bed is too short…) and this is a non-optional dimension of what Wittgenstein would 
have called the language game of measurement.   
The enhancement agenda has two clear aims.  These are the aims of (a) measuring 
and (b) raising or enhancing something.  More cynically, I would say that the aims of the 
agenda are to produce the appearance of doing these things.  One cannot appear to raise 
something in a way that will satisfy a sceptical electorate without appearing to measure 
that thing.  And one cannot appear to measure something without appearing to do this 
with precision, for the concept of precision is embodied in the concept of measurement. 
What is required, therefore, is an instrument of measurement that commands general 
approval and assent. 
Self-esteem questionnaires are the instrument of choice, and it must be said that 
they are widely accepted.  They assign numerical values to ticks in boxes, and what 
policy-makers want almost more than anything else is to get children to tick higher-
scoring boxes.  I say: they almost want this.  It satisfies one of their goals, which is to 
improve ‘measurable outcomes’.  However there are armies of researchers who are not 
necessarily friends of the government, ready to expose a flaw in this process.  This is 
what Nicholas Emler did.  He claimed to show that the high self-esteem which we had 
assumed was the key to a teenager’s sunny future was nothing of the kind.  On the 
contrary, high self-esteem is a risk factor for drug and alcohol abuse, racism, child abuse 
and an assortment of other ills.  Conversely the low self-esteem that we had blamed for 
society’s ills had little if nothing to answer for, for ‘the evidence was about as clear as it 
could be’ in ruling out a causal connection between low self-esteem and crime, racism 
and so on.
Emler’s study changed the landscape of self-esteem research, and I shall look at it 
more closely in the following section.  In particular, I shall be concerned about the use of 
self-esteem questionnaires as instruments of measurement.  One consequence of the study 
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was that it led to some careful re-marketing.  Well-being and social and emotional skills 
overtook their discredited cousin, self-esteem, in the public domain.  Except that the 
ideas refused to go away.  What we had was still a policy agenda with a bent towards 
measurable outcomes, and assumptions about ‘something’ that would cure social ills.  We 
still had little if any idea what this ‘something’ was, and some of us had a nagging 
suspicion that low self-esteem had been let off too lightly.  The recent debate reflects a 
more sophisticated view of the alleged trajectory from low to high self-esteem.  Emler’s 
discovery that high self-esteem causes drug and alcohol abuse, racism, child abuse and so 
on reminded us of those famous megalomaniacs whose unalloyed approval of themselves 
led to horrific atrocities.  Psychologist Roy Baumeister et al (2003) called high self-
esteem a ‘heterogeneous category’, observing that it encompasses ‘people who frankly 
accept their good qualities along with narcissistic, defensive and conceited individuals’. 
Several philosophers, including myself, have written about the excessive or too-high self-
esteem that presents as bravado, arrogance, big-headedness (Cigman 2004).
So what did Emler’s study show?  It is important to see that the thrust of his 
research was negative: he set out to demonstrate the absence of a causal link between low 
self-esteem and under-achievement, disaffection and violence, contrary to popular 
assumptions about, and public investment in, such a link.  Despite his acknowledgement 
that it is harder to disprove than prove causal linkages, he claimed success in this 
ambition.  But was he successful?  Did he really overturn a ‘popular view’?  In the next 
section, I try to answer this question.
4. Self-esteem: the popular view
Emler introduces his study with a short quotation:
Violent children hold other lives cheap because they believe their own lives to be 
worthless (Melanie Phillips, quoted Emler, 2001, p. 1).
This, he says, will strike a chord with readers because it ‘mirrors many widely accepted 
views’.  He is right: many people agree with this, and would add that they see under-
achieving children, teenage mothers, criminals, drug addicts as in this position because 
they ‘believe their own lives to be worthless’. 
12
This is an explanatory theory.  It says that people who manifest certain sorts of 
behaviour do so because they have low self-esteem.  ‘Because’ in this context signals a 
necessary condition; if you are violent or under-achieving, you must have a self-esteem 
problem.  People who believe this often believe that it works in the other direction too.  If 
you have low self-esteem (they think) you will inevitably (or almost inevitably) become a 
violent person, a person who does badly at school, a girl who gets pregnant at fifteen. 
This is a predictive theory, and it merges with the explanatory theory in the view that low 
self-esteem is necessary and sufficient for educational failure and anti-social behaviour.  
These ideas are simplistic and implausible.  There are no necessary or sufficient 
conditions for anti-social behaviour or educational failure, though journalists, self-help 
therapists and positive psychologists would like to think there are.  At most, there are 
loose causal connections, though it is exceedingly hard to specify what these are, 
especially if self-esteem or Q are poorly understood.  It would be wrong, in my view, to 
equate the explanatory/ predictive theory with the ‘everyday’ understanding of self-
esteem in a more functional sense.  The former is the absurd social vaccine view: inject a 
population with Q or self-esteem or whatever it is, and we all become happier, safer and 
more productive overnight.  Teachers and parents who worry about the self-esteem of the 
children in their care do not think this way; yet their concerns may have features in 
common with the explanatory/ predictive theory in the sense that they worry about the 
educational futures of children with low self-esteem, and look beyond the bravado of 
disruptive or violent children to see if they are covering a sense of low self-worth.  
The explanatory/ predictive theory is in essence the self-help conception of self-
esteem.  According to this conception, we may not know what self-esteem is, but we 
know that it needs to be enhanced in as many individuals as possible because it is the 
source of, and prerequisite for, all things good.  The challenge for anyone who is looking 
for a serious conception of self-esteem is to distinguish between this vapid, implausible 
idea and the ordinary, functional view of teachers and parents in the classroom and the 
home.  This Emler conspicuously fails to do.  Having quoted Phillips disparagingly, he 
goes on:
[Phillips’] observation will have struck a chord with many readers because it 
mirrors many widely accepted views.  These include the ideas that many children, 
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rather too many, are now growing up with a sense that they have no value, and 
that their damaged sense of their own worth in turn causes them to do violence to 
themselves and others (p. 1).
Here Phillips’ claim is linked to the ideas: (1) that many children are growing up 
with low self-esteem, and (2) that this causes them to be violent (one could add: to under-
achieve).  It seems to me quite wrong to conflate (1) and (2), as Emler does, with 
Phillips’ claim that all violent children believe their lives to be worthless.  The latter is 
indeed speculative hype.  (1), on the other hand, far from being hype, is almost certainly 
true.  Of course its truth needs to be confirmed (although the term ‘many’ is so vague that 
it could hardly be false), and this can only be done if we establish that we all mean the 
same thing by the ‘low self-esteem’ and agree about the methods by which its presence in 
greater and lesser (but not necessarily measurable) quantities and absence are assessed. 
But as a simple claim, based on ordinary observations to the effect that this child has low 
self-esteem, and these children and those children, it is surely sensible enough to take 
seriously.  (2) is less convincing, because it has the ring of a sufficient condition: if C has 
low-self-esteem, she will be violent (will under-achieve).  On the other hand, I would 
suggest that many parents and teachers are justified in being concerned that particular 
children with low self-esteem may under-achieve or behave disruptively or violently as a 
consequence of their low self-esteem.  They would need good reasons for thinking this 
about the children in question, rather than a causal hypothesis about self-esteem and its 
effects, but I see no reason in principle why such reasons should not exist.  On the 
contrary, the idea that Mary or Joe, who are always saying ‘I’m stupid’ or ‘I’m hopeless’ 
in class, might as a consequence of their feelings under-achieve, seems like a perfectly 
reasonable one. 
Discussing the analysis of difficult concepts like self-esteem, philosopher Kristjan 
Kristjansson (2007) writes:
Sometimes, as in the case of self-esteem, a clearly specified meaning may even be 
missing in ordinary language (it is not as though we could go into the field and 
ask the real self-esteem to please stand up); and in such cases, more radical 
conceptual regimentation may be required.  
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I disagree.  I believe that we can and should ask the real self-esteem to please stand up, 
just as we ask the real knowledge, the real justice or the real beauty to stand up when, as 
philosophers, we enquire into the ‘real’ uses and purposes of such words, as opposed to 
their corruptions in various theoretical contexts.  The concept of self-esteem is what we 
are concerned about when we notice that Mary or Joe is always putting her/himself down, 
and worry about how this will affect her/his future.  Self-esteem is an ethical concept, 
bound up with the notions of ‘too little’ and ‘too much’, and these crucially refer us to an 
individual’s flourishing.  Despite being hugely influential, Emler’s work misses all this, 
because it is locked into precisely the conceptual framework that it purports to overturn. 
He concludes that, not low self-esteem but high self-esteem is causally linked to alcohol 
and drug abuse, and risky sexual behaviour.  Moreover low self-esteem, like high self-
esteem, has no effect on educational achievement.  The conclusions are different from 
those of the self-helpers, but the basic assumptions are the same.  It is assumed that self-
esteem is incorrigibly known by self-report, so the absence of yardsticks by which to test 
these is not a serious difficulty.  It is assumed that the motives for filling in self-esteem 
questionnaires are transparent, so when a person ticks a box that says ‘strongly agree’ 
alongside the statement ‘I feel I have a number of good qualities’, this means that she 
feels she has a number of good qualities, end of story.  It is assumed that ‘more’ self-
esteem can be quantitatively distinguished from ‘less’ self-esteem, and that this can be 
done meaningfully without asking: how truthful are these feelings?  However, these are 
only assumptions, products of thinking.  We now need to go into the field.      
5. Will the real self-esteem please stand up?
What concerns does the preoccupation with self-esteem try to address?  I see this as the 
fundamental question.
This is different from the questions raised by most researchers in this area.  The 
usual starting point is a brief discussion about the meaning or definition of self-esteem in 
which the key question is whether this is a set of feelings or a set of beliefs, attitudes, 
judgements.  Why one answer or another is preferred (given that, as I argue, self-esteem 
involves them all) is never entirely clear.  To elect for one or another definition is not to 
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do what I have been arguing needs to be done, which is enquire about the nature of self-
esteem and the concerns that brought this concept to our attention in the first place.
The most popular definition is that of psychologist William James, who says that 
self-esteem is the ratio of people’s successes to their pretensions or aspirations.  For 
James, the basic question we need to ask when enquiring into a person’s self-esteem is: to 
what extent to you see yourself as having met your own standards and aspirations?  The 
many questionnaires that have been devised to measure self-esteem depart from this basic 
idea.  But here is a difficulty.  The easiest way to meet one’s standards and aspirations is 
to have none at all.  The child who feels so bad about herself that she feels unworthy to 
aspire to anything may have the highest ratio of successes to aspirations, i.e. in this sense, 
a very high level of self-esteem.  However, part of what people are concerned about when 
they are concerned about self-esteem is precisely the inability, failure or reluctance to 
aspire because one feels unworthy to aspire.  This idea—that in order to flourish, human 
beings need to feel ‘worthy to aspire’—is, I would argue, a crucial component of our 
ordinary concern about self-esteem. 
A good way to explore this is through a fictional character.  In good fiction, 
thought, beliefs, motives and actions are integral and highly transparent.  Assuming that 
the author is doing her job well, our role as readers is not to be sceptical (imagine 
someone saying, no, it didn’t really happen that way), but to be, as Henry James put it, 
‘finely aware and richly responsible’ (quoted by Nussbaum, 1990).  There is no place for 
doubt, as such; there is only a place for obtuseness, that is, for a failure to see, feel, be 
‘finely aware’.  This is a great advantage in a discussion like this.  I can question the 
motives of children who tick boxes in one way or another, and even if I know the 
children well, this question may remain unresolved.  I cannot question the motives of a 
fictional character in the same way, for such motives are (assuming that the fiction is 
good) there for me to find or fail to find in the text.  Novels create windows into human 
hearts and minds which may be interpreted differently, but cannot be in an ordinary sense 
opaque or hidden from view.     
The novel I shall look at is Untouchable, by Mulk Raj Anand, and the main 
character is a young man called Bakha.  Bakha is not only an ‘untouchable’, i.e. an 
outcaste from Hindu society.   He is a sweeper, which means that his role in life is to 
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clear away other people’s excrement, and he belongs to the bottom rung of the 
untouchable group socially.  His status compels him to shout warnings of his approach as 
he walks on the streets, so he can be avoided by people who believe they will be defiled 
by touching him.  Bakha has few aspirations.  The author tells us:
He had begun to work at the latrines at the age of six and resigned himself to the 
hereditary life of the craft…
He knows his place in society, and frankly accepts his extremely low status.  On one 
occasion he is walking along a street, and a Hindu man touches him accidentally.  He 
starts hurling abuse at Bakha, calling him a ‘low caste vermin’ and complaining that he 
will have to take a bath to purify himself.  This is Bakha’s response:
Bakha stood amazed, embarrassed.  He was deaf and dumb.  His senses were 
paralyzed.  Only fear gripped his soul, fear and humility and servility.  He was 
used to being spoken to roughly.  But he had seldom been taken so unawares. 
The curious smile of humility which always hovered on his lips in the presence of 
high-caste men now became more pronounced.  He lifted his face to the man 
opposite him, though his eyes were bent down.  Then he shot a hurried glance at 
the man.  The fellow’s eyes were flaming and red-hot (p. 46). 
Bakha cannot read, but if he were somehow able to fill in a self-esteem questionnaire, we 
would not expect a high result.  In particular, we would expect him to ‘strongly disagree’ 
with the statement on the well-known Rosenberg self-esteem scale: ‘I feel that I’m a 
person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.’
However, Bakha is a human being, and the picture is more complex than this. 
The idea of placing him on a trajectory from low to high self-esteem—i.e. of measuring 
his self-esteem—begins to looks absurd when we consider aspects of his life and 
personality.  We are told that, though Bakha had ‘resigned himself to the hereditary life 
of the craft’, he could not ‘consciously accept’ the fact that he was a sweeper, and indeed 
‘dreamed of becoming a sahib’.  He was resigned to a bleak existence, but felt worthy of 
a great deal more.  
Shortly after his self-deprecating response to the bullying Hindu, he is walking 
along the street, and there develops:
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…a smouldering rage in his soul.  His feelings would rise like spurts of smoke 
from a half-smothered fire, in fitful, unbalanced jerks when the recollection of 
some abuse or rebuke he had suffered kindled a spark in the ashes of remorse 
inside him. …‘Why was all this fuss?  Why was I so humble?  I could have struck 
him!’
The reader is relieved.  Thank goodness, one thinks; Bakha has some pride.  He was 
appropriately enraged by a terrible insult, and we see this, together with the fact that 
Bakha could not ‘consciously accept’ that he was a sweeper, as evidence that he has a 
modicum of self-esteem after all.     
This impression is strengthened by another brief incident.  One day Bakha has the 
bright idea of asking a higher caste child to teach him to read, and he cleverly bribes both 
the boy and his younger brother to give him lessons.  He needs to do this in order to 
prevent the younger child from feeling jealous and ratting on the older child to their 
mother; if she were to find out, that would be the end of lessons.  The deal is done and 
Bakha feels elated.  The author tells us that he:
… headed towards the gates of the town, his basket under one arm, his broom 
under another, and in his heart a song as happy as a lark’s.
There is, in my view, much to be learned from this story.  First, the story calls into 
question the idea that self-esteem and similar questionnaires are (as IQ tests were once 
wrongly thought to be) culture-independent.  On the improbable supposition that an 
individual like Bakha would complete such a questionnaire, we cannot ignore the way his 
responses would reflect how he has been taught to think and talk about himself by people 
he has been conditioned to see as in every way superior.  According to the picture we 
have of Bakha, the idea about talking well about himself in the company of literate 
people would be unthinkable.  
However the author of Untouchable encourages his readers to experience a 
tension between the ‘official’ sense of low self-worth that would no doubt manifest on a 
self-esteem test, and something that is equally if not more important.  Bakha’s eventual 
anger towards the Hindu bully, his sense of pride as he refuses to ‘consciously accept’ 
that he is a sweeper, and his confidence and joy in the face of an educational opportunity: 
these are crucial indicators of good self-esteem, and they make the book a richly 
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rewarding, rather than an agonizing and in some sense pointless read.  We know that 
people can be crushed by abuse and denigration.  Far more interesting are the ways in 
which they can be both crushed and uncrushable: both succumb to and rise above 
misfortune. 
I do not believe most teachers would have concerns about Bakha, were he 
miraculously to walk into their classrooms.  Yes, he might grovel and fawn for a while, 
but the crucial thing is that he would learn.  He would quickly learn to read (we are led to 
suppose), and one expects him to learn to look people in the eye, to stand tall if they bully 
him, and much else besides.  Bakha seems capable of learning all this because he has 
what we see in an everyday sense as ‘good’ self-esteem.  What this means, to repeat, is 
that he has ‘appropriate’ emotional tendencies.  He feels pride and anger rather than 
shame when bullied, and confidence and joy rather than fear at the prospect of learning.  
Consider another child called Emily.  Emily makes a cameo but unforgettable 
appearance in John Holt’s 1964 classic How children fail.  We do not know her age, but 
she is old enough to be expected to spell, or learn to spell, the word ‘microscope’.  Emily 
fails to do this in a test.  She bizarrely writes MINCOPERT, which indicates not only that 
she cannot spell ‘microscope’, but that she cannot properly attempt to spell this word.  As 
Holt puts it:
She obviously made a wild grab at the answer, and having written it down, never 
looked at it, never checked to see if it looked right.  I see a lot of this one-way, 
don’t-look-back-it’s-too-awful strategy among students (1964, pp. 19 – 20). 
It does not seem to have occurred to Holt, as it would occur to most of us nowadays, that 
Emily might belong to the group of individuals that are known as ‘dyslexic’.  The 
readiness to label children this way belongs to an area of controversy that I do not want to 
engage with here.  (Section II of this book—Julian Elliott’s and Simon Gibbs’ chapter in 
particular—is devoted to this fascinating topic.)  I am interested in the strategy that Holt 
vividly describes as ‘don’t-look-back-it’s-too-awful’, suggesting that it is employed by 
children who are too afraid of learning, too ashamed of their performances.  I am not 
suggesting that it is appropriate for children to feel fear or shame in the context of 
learning, so long as it is not ‘too much’, as I hope I have made clear.  The point is that 
some children experience these emotions in an extreme and debilitating excess.  Such 
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children, I believe, are encountered not infrequently in the classroom, and the expression 
‘low self-esteem’ naturally arises in this connection. 
We
 do not know, obviously, how Emily would fare on a self-esteem test, but I see no reason 
to assume that a child who tackles a spelling challenge this way would necessarily 
disagree with a statement like ‘I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal 
plane with others’.  Perhaps she is attractive and has a lot of friends; perhaps her looks 
and popularity enable her to present in many situations as a person with good self-esteem. 
However I suggest that this performance in a spelling test calls into question her self-
esteem, in an important and widely accepted use of that term.  Emily didn’t merely fail to 
meet a standard; she demonstrated (at that moment, at least) that she lacked the emotional 
resources to remedy that failure.  She ducked rather than faced the challenge.  If she were 
to adopt the ‘don’t-look-back-it’s-too-awful strategy’ in her education generally, she 
would no doubt fail at many things and be in danger of developing a sense of 
‘unworthiness to aspire’.
The child who cannot or will not make an effort to learn is of great educational 
concern, and it is this, I believe, that the enhancement agenda sets out to address.  The 
Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning (SEAL) programme says that it:
will be used by schools who have identified the social and emotional aspects of 
learning as a key focus for their work with the children. These will be schools 
who know that the factors holding back learning in their setting include children’s 
difficulties in understanding and managing their feelings, working co-operatively 
in groups, motivating themselves and demonstrating resilience in the face of 
setbacks (my italics).
The enhancement agenda is about certain ‘factors holding back learning’.  These are not 
physical, cognitive, social or cultural, but emotional.  We all know that such factors exist 
and can be hard to overcome.  What we have not succeeded in doing is understanding 
their nature, though expressions like ‘low self-esteem’, ‘poor social and emotional skills’, 
‘poor motivation’ and ‘poor resilience’ hint at this.  I would now like to venture a more 
detailed suggestion about the ‘nature of the phenomenon’ that these terms attempt to 
capture.  
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Emily, I suspect, is caught in a trap.  First, she fails, and the ‘don’t-look-back-it’s-
too-awful strategy’ used on the spelling test suggests that she may have a habit of failing. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Emily fails often.  As regular occurrences in 
a person’s life, failures tend to lead to a sense of worthlessness, as least in the competitive 
environments of schools.  This is not an empirical generalisation, but a comment on the 
expectations that are generated by our society.  Second, as a ‘worthless person’ in this 
sense, Emily is repeatedly confronted by educational challenges.  (She is a schoolchild, 
and schoolchildren face constant challenges.)  Emily has failed in the past—she has learnt 
to see herself as ineffective in the face of challenges—therefore, she expects to fail in the 
future.  The ‘don’t-look-back-it’s-too-awful strategy’ expresses a sense of the 
inevitability of failure, given repeated failures of the past.  
This, I submit, is the circular logic of failure, though the negative sequence of 
thinking is not inevitable, and indeed the aim of the enhancement agenda as I understand 
it is precisely to interrupt or overturn it.  The circular thought is this: I am worthless 
because/therefore I fail.  Because I have failed to achieve certain standards, therefore I 
will do so in the future.  The educator’s priority must be to stop such thinking in its 
tracks, and notions like resilience, persistence, motivation etc present themselves as 
possible ways to do this.  We must make children more motivated, more resilient… The 
concept of self-esteem plays a crucial role here.  There is a curious debate amongst 
philosophers about whether self-esteem has a motivational aspect; we have seen that 
some, like William James, see self-esteem as essentially backward-looking, a matter of 
rating one’s achievements relative to one’s aspirations.  Kristjan Kristjansson argues in 
this vein that self-esteem is conceptually independent of confidence, which is forward-
looking.  This misses the vital point that our concern about self-esteem is a concern about 
creatures which live inescapably in time, and are integrally backward-looking and 
forward-looking.  The circular logic of failure, as I described it, is low self-esteem on a 
temporal stage, in which negative self-appraisals feed into, and in some cases tragically 
undermine, executive, forward-looking behaviour.  We do not want this for children, and 
the recent intense interest in enhancement obscurely acknowledges this fact.  
6. Conclusion
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The enhancement agenda in education involves multiple errors.  It has based around a 
property to which a variety of terms have been appended; I called it simply Q.  It is 
assumed that Q is rather like blood pressure, quantifiably higher or lower.  It is supposed 
that Q belongs on a moral trajectory, where ‘more’ is always better than ‘less’.  Finally, it 
is supposed that Q is reliably measured by ‘tick behaviour’, as though it has never 
occurred to anyone to attribute ambivalent or complex motives to human actions.  
Some useful work has borne in on these fictions.  Baumeister’s observation that 
high self-esteem is a ‘heterogeneous category’ has aroused suspicions about the idea of 
the moral trajectory.  However the criticisms have not in my view gone far enough, for 
the interest in measurable outcomes persists.  There is still a tendency to attribute self-
esteem or well-being ‘quotients’ to entire populations, so that educators can get to work 
on boosting these and news can hopefully be broken that they have risen.  However, the 
real concept of self-esteem has nothing to do with quotients; indeed, I would say that it 
has a fairly limited application.  The ‘real concept’ expresses a concern about individuals 
who experience certain inappropriate emotions and get trapped in the circular logic of 
failure.  Of course, the emotions and the logic are inextricable; the latter involves a 
tendency to experience too much fear and shame, too little confidence and joy.    
There is a great deal of talk nowadays about ‘barriers to learning’, particularly for 
children who are seen as having difficulties and disabilities.  I have argued that low self-
esteem can be a significant barrier to learning, though human beings are (as I have said 
several times) sufficiently complex that it would be wrong to see this as a sufficient 
condition for educational failure.  Some children succeed precisely because they feel bad 
about themselves; they work hard (sometimes obsessively) to overturn this view of 
themselves.  Others, however, need help, and this should come in the form, first, of 
acknowledgement of the problem; second, of identification of particular children who 
suffer from the problem; third, of empirical work—particularly, I would think, by 
teachers—on the question: how can children be helped to escape from the circular logic 
of failure?  This is a question on which philosophers and empirical researchers can 
usefully converge, for it is about our ability to ‘prevail upon’ other people’s wills to 
aspire towards a better kind of life.   
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